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 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson
 Public vs. proprietary science:
 a fruitful tension ?
 What should be public and what
 should be private in scientific research ?
 The competitive sprint of public and
 private laboratories to complete the
 sequence of the human genome has
 brought this question to the fore. The
 same question frames the developing
 struggle over terms of access to human
 embryonic stem cell lines and the con
 flict between Microsoft and the open
 source movement over how best to pro
 mote software development.
 We expect such conflicts to become
 more widespread as the role of for-profit
 research expands in a broader range of
 scientific fields. Will science progress
 more swiftly and fruitfully if its findings
 are in the public domain, or if they may
 be captured as intellectual property?
 What kinds of research should be fund
 ed publicly and what kinds left for pri
 vate financing? Is competition between
 public and private science stimulating
 and constructive, or is it wasteful and
 counterproductive ?
 Our aim in this essay is to bring these
 issues into clearer view. They have been
 kept in the analytic shadows until
 recently by the presumption that science
 and technology are largely distinct
 enterprises. In fact, the problems arise in
 areas where science and technology
 overlap.
 We thus begin our discussion by
 reviewing the conventional distinction
 between science and technology. We
 then consider different perspectives on
 the appropriate public and private
 spheres in fields where science and tech
 nology are intertwined, first in general,
 and then in the context of the Human
 Genome Project. We conclude with a
 brief analysis of policy options.
 It is often assumed that science and
 technology are - or ought to be - inde
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 pendent enterprises. In a classic series of
 essays, collected in his 1973 book The
 Sociology of Science, Robert Merton
 described science as a public enterprise
 generating public knowledge. This has
 become the standard view, accepted by
 many working scientists.
 According to this theory, the goal of
 scientific research is to advance funda
 mental knowledge about the world. This
 effort need not be directly useful, much
 less profitable, at least in the near term,
 although sponsors and practitioners of
 science generally expect that advances in
 scientific understanding will foster later
 useful advances in applied technology.
 The principal venues for science are uni
 versities and government laboratories,
 and the principal reward for success is
 recognition and acclaim from the scien
 tific community. Open disclosure of
 research results, through timely publica
 tion and other mechanisms permitting
 free access, is the norm. Since research
 ers do not earn financial returns from
 this work, they rely on philanthropic or
 public funding.
 Most social theorists, including
 Merton, have drawn a sharp contrast
 between basic science and applied tech
 nology. While basic science is a public
 enterprise pursuing fundamental knowl
 edge, applied technology is a private
 enterprise pursuing proprietary solu
 tions to practical problems. The goal of
 the individuals and firms doing such
 applied research is to solve practical
 problems in the hope of earning profits.
 Such research draws freely on the pool of
 public scientific knowledge, but does not
 contribute to that pool. Intellectual
 property rights protect the profits of
 those who invest in successful technolo
 gy research, preserving incentives to
 provide additional funding.
 There is considerable truth in this con
 ventional account and the distinction
 between science and technology on
 which it rests. Basic science and applied
 technology often differ in important
 ways and flourish under different insti
 tutional regimes. Horace Freeland Jud
 son's fine history of molecular biology,
 The Eighth Day of Creation, illustrates the
 power of a research regime in which all
 scientists can draw freely upon the prior
 work of others, each pursuing their par
 ticular interests and bets regarding the
 most promising lines of inquiry, check
 ing, correcting, and building upon each
 other's results. At the same time, the his
 tory of technological progress in such
 fields as pharmaceuticals shows the
 power of profit incentives to promote
 the development of products that meet
 human needs.
 What the conventional account leaves
 out, however, is the often complex ways
 in which basic science and applied tech
 nology frequently overlap. Such cases of
 overlap raise difficult questions about
 where, and how, to draw lines between
 the public and private spheres. More
 over, in cases where science and technol
 ogy do overlap, public and private inter
 ests may conflict - which only makes
 more pressing the question of where,
 and how, to distinguish between what
 ought to be public and what ought to be
 private.
 From the start of modern science,
 many scientists have been interested in
 practical problems, and the challenge of
 solving those problems has driven their
 search for fundamental knowledge. Uni
 versities long have dedicated a consider
 able portion of their research efforts to
 understanding and solving practical
 problems, particularly in the United
 States, where, until World War II, agri
 culture occupied a large share of aca
 demic research. In the postwar era, med
 ical schools have accounted for a large
 and growing share of research at u. S.
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 universities, currently amounting to
 roughly half of the total. Much of this
 work is motivated by the practical goal
 of improving human health.
 More generally, much academic sci
 ence lies in what the late Donald Stokes
 called "Pasteur's Quadrant."1 Standard
 taxonomies place the pursuit of funda
 mental knowledge and the solution of
 practical problems at opposite ends of a
 one-dimensional spectrum from "basic"
 to "applied" research; Stokes's taxono
 my recognizes that the work of many
 scientists combines both objectives
 simultaneously. Like Niels Bohr, Louis
 Pasteur sought fundamental under
 standing, and like Thomas Edison, he
 sought solutions to practical problems.
 For scientists conducting research with
 in "Pasteur's Quadrant," the objective is
 to achieve the fundamental understand
 ing necessary to solve practical prob
 lems.
 This hybrid motivation characterizes
 most research in the biom?dical sciences
 as well as in material science, computer
 science, and theoretical work in engi
 neering. These fields are not exception
 al : they are in the mainstream of con
 temporary academic research, posing a
 serious challenge to a taxonomy that
 draws a sharp distinction between basic
 science and applied technology. In re
 cent years private industry has been a
 growing source of funds for academic
 research in these areas, and universities
 have been increasingly inclined to patent
 their discoveries.
 The other side of the coin is that cor
 porate research and development (R&D)
 often involves the pursuit of fundamen
 tal knowledge. Many technologies
 depend on scientific knowledge, and
 focused scientific research is often essen
 tial in order to advance these technolo
 gies. Some private firms perform basic
 research, and many of their researchers
 publish scientific papers, although for
 profit firms are less inclined than univer
 sities to place their findings in the public
 domain without restrictions.
 In fields where scientific advances
 have conspicuous commercial potential
 (such as pharmaceutical research), the
 pursuit of profit and the pursuit of
 knowledge often converge, creating sub
 stantial overlap in research pursued in
 academic and industrial settings. Re
 search results are at once part of a grow
 ing corpus of scientific knowledge for
 use in further research and an important
 step toward a promising commercial
 product. Within this zone of overlap,
 Mertonian public science and market
 driven proprietary research coexist, set
 ting the stage for conflict over what
 should be public and what should be pri
 vate. The challenge for public policy is to
 devise arrangements that preserve the
 great advantages of an open system for
 basic science while still preserving profit
 incentives for the creation of valuable
 new products.
 In our view, a common way of thinking
 about how to draw the line between
 public and private science is seriously
 misleading. It is often said that public
 science ought to focus only on research
 that private firms will not conduct. If
 certain areas of research appear to have
 high social value yet promise relatively
 low returns, then public financing may
 be necessary to correct for the failure of
 markets to get the job done. Private
 sponsors might not expect to capture
 enough value to justify R&D costs if
 anticipated research results are far
 removed from practical applications, if
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 more generally, if profits are highly
 uncertain. On the other hand, if the
 research offers a reasonable prospect of
 yielding practical benefits, if intellectual
 property law permits the sponsor to
 appropriate a sufficient share of the
 value of those benefits, and if private
 firms are therefore willing to undertake
 the research, so much the better. In this
 case, it is commonly argued, public
 funds are not needed and should be
 spent for other purposes (or left in the
 pockets of taxpayers).
 This analysis assumes that the only
 argument for public support of science is
 that important research would not occur
 without it. Although this is an excellent
 reason for public support of research, it
 is not the only reason. Even if expected
 practical benefits make patentable out
 comes likely and motivate private firms
 to pay for the research, public funding
 might still be justified in order to in
 crease the open domain of commonly
 owned knowledge upon which scientists
 may draw freely in future research.
 From an economic standpoint, patents
 are not an unmixed blessing. Patent
 rights motivate private firms to invest in
 research, but they also introduce signifi
 cant inefficiencies that may inhibit
 future research. Patents permit innova
 tors to restrict access to, and thus raise
 prices for, their inventions. Although
 sometimes necessary to allow firms to
 recover R&D costs and thus profit from
 innovation, such pricing is inefficient,
 because it excludes users who would be
 willing to pay enough to cover marginal
 production costs but not the additional
 patent premium. The resulting losses
 could be considerable if the excluded
 users are not merely private consumers,
 but publicly funded researchers per
 forming a socially valuable activity.
 While the effect of patents on prices
 has been a central concern of econo
 mists, we think another inefficient
 aspect of patents is especially important
 in the context of scientific research :
 patents on essential materials and pro
 cesses may require researchers to seek
 licenses before they proceed, which can
 impose significant transaction costs. In
 biom?dical research today, exchanges of
 proprietary research materials, tech
 niques, and data are increasingly gov
 erned by material transfer agreements,
 patent license agreements, and database
 access agreements.
 At a minimum these agreements need
 to be reviewed and approved before
 research proceeds ; often they must be
 renegotiated, leading to further delays
 and sometimes to bargaining breakdown
 with the potential for future litigation.2
 Having the relevant knowledge and ma
 terials freely available in the public do
 main minimizes transaction costs by
 relieving users of the need to identify
 and bargain with intellectual property
 owners.
 A third problem patents present for
 research activity is that they may give
 patent holders broad control over future
 research paths, allowing them to block
 research by rivals. Patents on fundamen
 tal discoveries that open up new re
 search areas are typically broader than
 patents on incremental technological
 advances in established fields, because
 the principal constraint on the scope of
 92 D dalus Spring 2002
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 patent claims is the prior state of knowl
 edge in the relevant field.3 Broad claims
 on early discoveries that are fundamen
 tal to emerging fields of knowledge are
 particularly worrisome in light of the
 great value, demonstrated time and
 again in the history of science and tech
 nology, of having many independent
 minds at work trying to advance a field.
 Public science has flourished by permit
 ting scientists to challenge and build
 upon the work of rivals. Intellectual
 property rights to fundamental discover
 ies threaten to limit the number of play
 ers in the system at an early stage, there
 by diminishing its power.
 On the other hand, private enterprise
 has been an extraordinarily powerful
 engine for the generation of new prod
 ucts and processes, and in some fields
 (notably pharmaceuticals) strong patent
 protection has been a vital part of the
 system. Businesses, driven by the hope
 of profit and the fear of competition,
 have a far better feel than government
 agencies for the kinds of new products
 the market wants and can respond more
 quickly to emerging demand and tech
 nological opportunities.
 For the most part, the inefficiencies
 associated with patents do not generate
 strong pressures to substitute public
 R&D for proprietary R&D, even for prod
 ucts such as pharmaceuticals that meet
 important public needs. Although we
 might lament the high cost of patented
 drugs, the advantages of promoting pri
 vate investment in new product develop
 ment generally outweigh the inefficien
 cies of patents. Rather than displacing
 private R&D, the government can subsi
 dize access to patented inventions for
 needy users (such as AIDS patients in
 sub-Saharan Africa or Medicare patients
 in the United States).
 The problem that concerns us arises
 when the domain of public science
 becomes entangled with the domain of
 proprietary product development. This
 zone of overlap has been growing steadi
 ly since the late 1970s. An important fac
 tor has been the development of molec
 ular biology, a science squarely in Pas
 teur's Quadrant, as a field of both public
 and private research. Partly because of a
 series of laws often referred to collec
 tively as "the Bayh-Dole Act," by which
 businesses and universities can claim
 property rights to technology created
 under publicly funded programs, univer
 sities have become active participants in
 the patent system.4 A large share of uni
 versity patents are in molecular biology.
 Many of these patents cover basic dis
 coveries :5 as the Patent and Trademark
 Office (PTO) and courts have allowed
 such "upstream" patents, a significant
 private industry has grown up around
 pre-product development research in
 molecular biology, seeking to profit by
 patenting and licensing discoveries to
 other firms that use them to develop
 commercial products. The result has
 been a considerable blurring of the
 public-private divide, with universities
 and other one-time champions of open
 science claiming their own intellectual
 property, while private firms extend pro
 prietary research further upstream,
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 demie scientists and sometimes in com
 petition with them.
 Although the convergence of public
 and private resources for biom?dical
 research has accelerated progress, we
 believe that current policy and practice
 may have gone too far in promoting
 patenting of fundamental research dis
 coveries.
 Patents on inventions with clear prac
 tical applications may well facilitate
 product development, but patents on
 discoveries that may spur future basic
 research impose serious costs on the sci
 entific enterprise and are much harder to
 justify. The Bayh-Dole Act ignores this
 distinction, although it is becoming
 increasingly important to federal agen
 cies that support fundamental research
 and to private firms that draw on emerg
 ing knowledge to develop new products.
 The Human Genome Project provides a
 useful focus for exploring these issues.
 iublic and private efforts to complete
 the DNA sequence of the human genome
 vividly illustrate the interests at stake in
 mediating the public-private divide in
 Pasteur's Quadrant. Although the
 Human Genome Project began in the
 late 1980s as a government funded "Big
 Science" project, from the outset it
 promised both new fundamental knowl
 edge and practical payoffs with the
 potential for commercial profit.6
 By the late 1980s private firms already
 had a substantial presence in genetics
 and molecular biology and had devel
 oped proprietary tools that would great
 ly accelerate the Human Genome Pro
 ject, including automated DNA-sequenc
 ing machines and the polymerase chain
 reaction. The mass-production character
 of sequencing 3 billion base pairs of
 DNA, and the "top-down" organization
 such a task seemed to entail, set it apart
 from the investigator-initiated proposals
 for creative, small-scale, academic inves
 tigations that had been typical of NIH
 funded research. Yet talk of private ini
 tiatives to sequence the genome repeat
 edly provoked concerns about ensuring
 access to the data for use in future re
 search, renewing enthusiasm for public
 funding.
 Private investors have repeatedly fund
 ed targeted projects within the broad
 scope of the Human Genome Project
 that seemed likely to yield commercially
 significant results, sometimes taking
 advantage of the reluctance of the public
 project to focus on "cream-skimming"
 projects that could jeopardize later sup
 port for the more costly job of complet
 ing a definitive reference sequence of the
 human genome.7 In the early 1990s pri
 vate firms focused on sequencing the
 estimated 3 percent of the genome that
 cells use to make proteins, using an
 approach called "cDNA sequencing."
 One such firm, Human Genome Sci
 ences, was founded to exploit a research
 strategy pioneered by Dr. J. Craig Venter,
 then at the NIH, of using automated
 DNA-sequencing machines to obtain
 partial sequences (called expressed
 sequence tags, or ESTs) for genes ex
 pressed in human tissue samples.
 94 D dalus Spring 2002
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 While academic researchers debated
 the wisdom of pursuing this strategy
 given available technology, resources,
 and priorities, private investors seized
 the opportunity to bypass skeptical gov
 ernment sponsors and peer reviewers
 and created a nonprofit research institu
 tion to support Venter's work, reserving
 commercial rights for Human Genome
 Sciences. This and similar efforts created
 valuable private databases of informa
 tion, but academic institutions soon
 complained about the restrictive terms
 of access offered by the database own
 ers.
 In the mid-1990s, when new technolo
 gy made it feasible to detect and identify
 single base-pair differences in the DNA
 of different individuals (single nucleo
 tide polymorphisms, or SNPs), private
 firms invested in SNP identification.
 Like gene fragments, SNPs promised to
 be a valuable information resource for
 both academic research and product
 development. Recent experience with
 proprietary databases of gene fragments
 led some scientists to worry that propri
 etary SNP collections might not be ac
 cessible to them on reasonable terms,
 prompting the public Human Genome
 Project to compete with the private sec
 tor by allocating some of its own funds
 to SNP identification.
 In May of 1998, just as the public
 Human Genome Project had completed
 its initial mapping goals and was enter
 ing the phase of large-scale sequencing
 of the genome, a new private company
 came on the scene with the goal of com
 pleting the sequence several years ahead
 of the public project - under the scien
 tific direction of Craig Venter, who by
 then had left the NIH. The new compa
 ny, to be called "Celera" after the Latin
 word for speed, would use a new genera
 tion of DNA-sequencing machines and
 pursue a "whole-genome shotgun se
 quencing" strategy that Venter had used
 successfully to sequence microbial
 genomes.8 Like cDNA sequencing,
 whole-genome shotgun sequencing was
 a strategy that the academic community
 had so far passed up for the human
 genome,9 leaving an opportunity on the
 table that private investors seized. But
 this was a more surprising plan from a
 business perspective. By this time cDNA
 sequencing had revealed many of the
 commercially promising genes (and gen
 erated patent applications on them).
 Although more genes were expected to
 surface in the course of completing the
 genome, most of the remaining se
 quence was presumed to be "junk DNA"
 of greater interest to scientists than to
 inv stors. Nonetheless, investors were
 sufficiently optimistic to drive the mar
 ket capitalization of Celera up to over
 two billion dollars by the end of 1999.
 The sponsors of the Human Genome
 Project responded by accelerating and
 increasing their financial commitments
 t  complete the public version of the
 sequence more rapidly. At first, they crit
 icized Celera's proposed sequencing
 strategy, charging that it would leave
 significant gaps in coverage that would
 be difficult and costly to finish. Soon,
 however, the public project changed its
 own course in order to provide an un
 finished "rough draft" of the genome as
 quickly as possible. The two groups
 claimed substantial completion of their
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 cations in Science and Nature in February
 of 2001.10
 The brief history of public and private
 involvement in sequencing the human
 genome shows conflicting views from
 the two estates regarding the importance
 of making knowledge freely available in
 the public domain. Free access to the
 genome has been a mantra within the
 public genome community, repeatedly
 invoked as a motivation for accelerated
 disclosure policies and justification for
 accelerated funding to complete the
 sequence before private competitors
 capture it as a proprietary resource.
 Although it is a common ploy to invoke
 public-spirited justifications in support
 of requests for public funding, it is hard
 er to dismiss the many concurring views
 emanating from the private sector,
 sometimes backed by private funds to
 generate information in the public
 domain.
 From the beginning, scientists worried
 that it would be difficult to enforce
 norms of public disclosure and access
 for sequences generated by different sci
 entists in different institutions. The
 usual trigger for disclosure in academic
 research - publication of results - would
 not serve as a timely enforcer for release
 of accumulating data that might not be
 ripe for journal publication until long
 after it was generated. The presence of
 commercial interests and the looming
 prospect of intellectual property claims
 heightened these concerns.
 Controversy over the public or private
 character of the genome erupted more
 urgently in 1991 when the NIH filed
 patent applications on the first few hun
 dred gene fragments (or ESTs) se
 quenced by Craig Venter. This was a
 provocative act on many levels. The
 patent filings, although consistent with
 U.S. laws encouraging government agen
 cies to patent discoveries and license
 them for commercial development,11
 were in tension with rhetorical justifi
 cations for public funding of the Human
 Genome Project to ensure public access
 to the sequence. Foreign governments
 viewed the patent filings by a U.S. gov
 ernment agency as inconsistent with
 efforts to promote the Human Genome
 Project as an international collaboration
 to reveal the universal heritage of hu
 manity. Patent claims for the discovery
 of mere fragments of genes struck many
 scientists as a premature reservation of
 commercial rewards for incomplete
 research results that were not yet mean
 ingful and required further research to
 identify useful applications. Industry
 trade groups feared that patents on gene
 fragments would inhibit research to
 understand the role of genes in disease
 and would add to the costs of drug
 development.
 Databases of ESTs quickly proved to
 be a valuable information resource for
 both private and academic scientists. But
 the two groups faced different con
 straints on their ability to gain access to
 the proprietary databases. As pharma
 ceutical firms signed database access
 agreements with price tags ranging from
 under $10 million to over $100 million,
 academic institutions balked at signing
 agreements that would commit them in
 advance to share future intellectual
 g6 D dalus Spring 2002
 ?o J. Craig Venter et al., "The Sequence of the
 Human Genome," Science 291 (16 February
 2001) : 1304-1351 ; International Human
 Genome Sequencing Consortium, "Initial
 sequencing and analysis of the human
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 il See Bernadine Healy, "Special Report on
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 property rights with the database own
 ers. Finally, in a dramatic inversion of
 traditional public and private roles, the
 Merck pharmaceutical firm agreed to
 sponsor a competing cDNA sequencing
 effort at Washington University, with
 newly identified sequences to be
 promptly disclosed in a public data
 base.12 Paradoxically, a controversy that
 began with patent filings from a govern
 ment agency ultimately gave way to an
 extraordinary private-sector endorse
 ment of the value of the public domain.
 Another variation on traditional pub
 lic and private roles occurred a few years
 later when ten pharmaceutical firms
 joined the Wellcome Trust Foundation
 to form the SNP Consortium, a private
 venture to identify common points of
 variation in the human genome for dis
 closure in the public domain. SNP iden
 tification had begun as proprietary re
 search in the private sector, provoking
 the public Human Genome Project to
 call for a consortium of federal agencies
 to fund SNP discovery and to place the
 results in unrestricted public databas
 es. x3 The candid justification for public
 funding was to prevent private appropri
 ation of SNPs as intellectual property.
 But this strategy was constrained by the
 Bayh-Dole Act, which allows grant re
 cipients to retain title to inventions
 unless the funding agreement specifies
 otherwise based upon an appealable
 finding of "exceptional circumstances."14
 Loath to invoke this rarely used and
 cumbersome provision, the NIH took a
 different approach. In its request for
 grant applications, the NIH stressed the
 importance of making SNP information
 readily available to the research commu
 nity, advised grant applicants that their
 plans for sharing results would be con
 sidered by NIH staff as one of the criteria
 for an award, and warned that the NIH
 would monitor grantee patenting activi
 ty.15 This approach was arguably in ten
 sion with the spirit, if not the letter, of
 the Bayh-Dole Act. Ultimately, the pri
 vate sector again came to the rescue of
 the public domain with the formation of
 the SNP Consortium, which unabash
 edly proclaims a strategy of identifying
 and disclosing SNPs in order to prevent
 other firms from patenting them. Once
 again, in the Bayh-Dole era it appeared
 to be simpler for private firms to endow
 the public domain than it was for the
 federal government to do the same.
 The importance of public access to the
 human genome figured prominently in
 the case for continued funding of the
 public Human Genome Project follow
 ing Celera's entry into the field. Celera's
 founders acknowledged the importance
 of free access by promising initially to
 release Celera's raw sequence data to the
 public on a quarterly basis,16 although
 the timing and details of this commit
 ment wavered thereafter. The public
 sponsors of the Human Genome Project
 stressed the importance of prompt and
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 which they ensured by requiring
 grantees to deposit new sequence data in
 the publicly accessible Genbank data
 base within twenty-four hours.17 Cel
 era's business model, which involves
 selling access to proprietary data and
 bioinformatics capabilities that sub
 scribers would not pay for if they could
 get them for free, constrains its disclo
 sure policies. Although Celera's promised
 quarterly data releases never occurred,
 Celera agreed to provide limited access
 to its data free of charge on its own web
 site as a condition of publication in
 Science, subject to restrictions that pre
 served the market for its proprietary
 products.
 Celera has had more success than prior
 owners of proprietary genomics data
 bases in marketing database access
 agreements to academic and govern
 ment subscribers. It has made agree
 ments on undisclosed financial terms
 with a number of major research univer
 sities and academic hospitals, as well as
 with the National Cancer Institute. Evi
 dently Celera has something to sell over
 and above the information and tools that
 are freely available from Genbank, and
 evidently Celera's terms of access are not
 prohibitive for publicly funded investi
 gators. Celera's database should be at
 least as good as the public database,
 given that Celera itself has free access to
 Genbank. At the same time, the exis
 tence of a public database with much of
 the same information presumably limits
 what subscribers are willing to pay (and
 what Celera is able to demand) for
 access to the proprietary database. The
 existence of Genbank may thus con
 strain Celera's market power in ways
 that make the proprietary data more
 affordable for all researchers.
 The story of the Human Genome
 Project in the public and private spheres
 is not yet over. Although most of the
 genome has now been sequenced, the
 hard work of figuring out what it all
 means has barely begun. So far, the most
 significant intellectual property con
 straint on use of the sequence in re
 search has come from the terms of data
 base access agreements rather than from
 patents. But many patent applications
 are pending on genes, gene fragments,
 SNPs, and even DNA sequences stored in
 computer-readable medium, and many
 of these patent applications were filed
 before the same sequences were deposit
 ed in Genbank. Although the patenting
 of DNA molecules that encode therapeu
 tic proteins is a well-established prac
 tice, the patentability of DNA sequences
 with more speculative utility is much
 contested and has not yet been ad
 dressed by the courts. Depending on
 how these issues of patentability are
 resolved, scientists might soon discover
 that they need patent licenses to make
 use of sequences they thought were in
 the public domain.
 Although it may never be known
 whether public or private research
 efforts ultimately contribute more to
 future biom?dical research and product
 development, it is probably safe to say
 that neither of these efforts would have
 achieved as much as quickly without the
 other. Apart from providing additional
 and complementary capabilities and
 enabling technologies, the private sector
 has repeatedly provided funding for pro
 ductive research strategies that public
 sponsors passed over.
 In a Big Science project that allocates
 government research funds according to
 a coordinated plan, the existence of a
 98 D dalus Spring 2002
 17 Testimony of Francis S. Collins, Director,
 National Human Genome Research Institute, at
 a Hearing on the Human Genome Project
 before the Energy and Environment Subcom
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 vigorous private-sector research enter
 prise limits the risk that good ideas will
 go unfunded, at least when they offer a
 reasonable chance of yielding practical
 payoffs. The peer-review process for
 allocating government research funds
 does much to ensure the political inde
 pendence and high quality of public sci
 ence, but it may tend to favor conven
 tional approaches and prevailing beliefs
 over bold new ideas. Competition
 among researchers pursuing different
 strategies with similar goals speeds sci
 ence along and improves the likelihood
 of success.
 At the same time, freely available data
 from the Human Genome Project has
 undoubtedly accelerated research in
 both the public and private sectors. In
 addition to providing a free resource for
 users of genomic information, it has
 improved the completeness of propri
 etary databases (by providing data that
 owners may incorporate in proprietary
 products and by setting a benchmark
 that they must exceed in order to have
 something to sell) and improved terms
 of access to proprietary databases (by
 providing a free alternative that limits
 how much owners may demand).
 Although proprietary databases might
 be more profitable if there were no
 Genbank, the free database plainly has
 neither destroyed the market for propri
 etary databases nor undermined incen
 tives to create them.
 JLN umerous public-policy choices deter
 mine the balance between public and
 private research in Pasteur's Quadrant.
 These choices include legal rules about
 what may be patented and how patents
 are used and managed, as well as deci
 sions about what kinds of research the
 government will fund and what strings
 are attached to public funding.
 If science and technology were entire
 ly separate estates, one might preserve
 an open domain for science by limiting
 what may be patented to technology
 while relying on public funding to pro
 mote science. This is arguably the intu
 ition behind traditional legal exclusions
 from patent protection for natural prod
 ucts and laws of nature and for inven
 tions with no demonstrated practical
 utility.18 But steady pressure to provide
 patent protection for discoveries in
 Pasteur's quadrant has eroded these
 restrictions. Perhaps the erosion has
 gone too far.
 Long before the advent of commercial
 genomics, the courts had narrowly con
 strued the exclusion dealing with prod
 ucts of nature to uphold patents on
 purified preparations of products isolat
 ed from nature.19 Although intuitively
 appealing, excluding the stuff of nature
 from patent protection has no clear basis
 in the patent statute, and judicial opin
 ions recognizing the exclusion have
 failed to articulate a consistent rationale
 for it. It has thus been vulnerable to the
 same systematic erosion of judicial lim
 its on patentability that has recently
 made way for patents on computer algo
 rithms and business methods.20
 The utility requirement has a clear
 statutory basis,21 and academic scien
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 natural products, see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
 Inoculant Co., 333 US 127 (1948). On patents on
 inventions with no demonstrated practical
 application, see Brenner v. Manson, 383 US 519
 (1966).
 19 E.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
 Corp., 253 F2d 156 (4th Cir 1958) (upholding
 patentability of purified vitamin B12).
 20 See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature
 Financial Group, 149 F3d 1368 (Fed. Cir 1998),
 cert, denied, 515 US 1093 (1999) ; AT&T Corp. v.
 Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F3d 1352 (1999).
 21 35 US Code ?? 101,112.
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 requirement to reject patent claims on
 DNA sequences until their biological
 function is understood. But an appellate
 court sharply rebuked the PTO just a few
 years ago for applying a strict utility
 standard to biotechnology products ; the
 court reminded the PTO that "usefulness
 in patent law, and in particular in the
 context of pharmaceutical inventions,
 necessarily includes the expectation of
 further research and development."22 At
 least as presently understood, the utility
 requirement does not seem to preclude
 patenting fundamental discoveries with
 practical implications that remain un
 proven.
 These time-honored limitations on the
 reach of the patent system have arguably
 been degraded without explicit attention
 from Congress and may now need to be
 fortified to preserve the freedom of sci
 entists to study the natural world. A nec
 essary first step would be a careful analy
 sis of the purposes these rules serve in
 mediating the public-private divide in
 science and technology. On one hand,
 withholding patent protection could
 prove costly if it undermines private
 R&D incentives. On the other hand, the
 benefits to future research and product
 development of preserving the scope
 and vigor of public science might out
 weigh these costs.
 Another option would be to carve out
 an exemption from infringement liabili
 ty for researchers. Ideally, this approach
 would retain effective protection against
 competition in the commercial market
 place while minimizing the impact of
 patents on the research community.
 But it is difficult to define the proper
 scope of such an exemption when there
 is no clear line between the commercial
 and research spheres. Should researchers
 in academic and commercial laborato
 ries be treated similarly? Should patents
 on research tools that have no significant
 market outside the research community
 be subject to a research exemption that
 effectively eviscerates their commercial
 value? The Human Genome Project
 offers numerous examples of patented
 research tools that were marketed to
 both academic and commercial re
 searchers to the great benefit of the
 research community. Such tools might
 never have been developed without
 patents, making the ultimate impact on
 research of such a change in the law
 difficult to predict. On the other hand,
 many important research tools have
 come out of government-funded univer
 sity research, and their invention
 arguably did not require patent protec
 tion.
 Yet another option, which would not
 require changing the patent rights of pri
 vate firms, would be to provide public
 funding to generate research results in
 the public domain, even if the private
 sector is already performing similar
 research on a proprietary basis.
 This was ultimately the strategy pur
 sued by the public sponsors of the
 Human Genome Project, although they
 had to maneuver around the Bayh-Dole
 Act to do it. The extraordinary commit
 ment in the scientific community to
 making the human genome sequence
 freely available offered the sponsors pro
 tective cover for a policy that grantees
 might otherwise have challenged as con
 trary to the law. But if the Bayh-Dole Act
 impedes the ability of public research
 sponsors to enrich the public domain of
 science, perhaps it needs revision.
 The flourishing of a robust private
 genomics industry alongside the public
 Human Genome Project calls into ques
 tion the strong presumption under the
 Bayh-Dole Act that the results of govern
 ment-sponsored research must be pat
 ?OO D dalus Spring 2002
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 ented in order to preserve incentives for
 follow-on research in the private sector.
 That the pharmaceutical industry has
 repeatedly conspired with public spon
 sors to get genomic information into the
 public domain at its own expense is
 compelling evidence that proprietary
 control of information can impose sig
 nificant costs on subsequent research
 and thereby obstruct, rather than pro
 mote, product development.
 But public science is more than a pre
 lude to product development. At its best,
 it is a social commitment to disinterest
 ed investigation of the world by credible
 experts operating under the critical
 scrutiny of their peers. It is a shared
 archive of an expanding knowledge
 base, a training ground for future re
 searchers, and the germ from which
 future advances in human understand
 ing will grow. Its social value does not
 depend on the ultimate profitability of
 the advances it spawns. If we need
 profit-seeking firms to tell us that the
 public domain has value, something
 important is missing from our under
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